Serbia says U.N. making mistake over Kosovo policing

Serbia's foreign minister said on Sunday it was a mistake for the U.N. mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) to hand over policing in the province to the European Union without the consent of Serbia and the U.N. Security Council.

"The process of UNMIK reconfiguration has begun...without consent of all interested parties and without explicit approval by the U.N. Security Council," Vuk Jeremic was quoted by Beta news agency as saying. "We think that this is a big mistake."

UNMIK and the European Union mission EULEX are due to sign a memorandum of understanding on Monday on a plan which has been opposed by Serbia and Russia and split the Security Council.

A 2,200-member EU police mission is waiting to deploy in Kosovo.

Kosovo, long a province of Serbia, was placed under U.N. administration in 1999 after NATO bombing drove out Serb forces accused of mass killings of civilians in a two-year war against separatist guerrillas.

The ethnic Albanian majority of Kosovo declared independence in February. Many Western countries recognized it, but Serbia and its big-power ally Russia declared the move illegal.

Jeremic was speaking after returning from New York where he asked the U.N. General Assembly to include in its annual, mid-September session Serbia's request for an opinion from the International Court of Justice on whether Kosovo's declaration of independence was legal.

He said he expected that talks with UNMIK, to continue in the coming weeks, would result in an agreement which would be "explicitly confirmed by the U.N. Security Council, thereby winning full international legality."

"ENERGETIC" RUSSIAN SUPPORT

U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said in June he planned to "reconfigure" UNMIK.

In his July report to the Security Council he said that because the council was "unable to give guidance" he had asked the mission to cooperate with the EU "in order for it to assume an enhanced operational role in Kosovo in the area of the rule of law under the overall authority of the United Nations."

Russia, like Serbia, strongly opposes an EU takeover and Russian ambassador to Belgrade Alexander Konuzin told Politika daily in an interview published on Sunday that Serbia could count on "energetic" Russian support.

Russia was aware that the reconfiguration had started and planned to file a protest to the U.N. Secretariat, he said.

Agreement with the EU on Kosovo, along with capturing and handing over the two remaining war crimes indictees sought by the Hague tribunal would aid Serbia's accession to the EU, former foreign minister Goran Svilanovic said.

"If we were to eliminate those two obstacles by the end of this year or the middle of the next year, Serbia would for the first time since 2000 be in a situation to have a clear and open path to Europe," Svilanovic told Blic daily.

The government led by President Boris Tadic took office in July and declared EU membership a priority. But Tadic has told the Security Council that Belgrade cannot endorse Ban's plan.

Kosovo moves ahead after independence, but concerns remain

On the surface, Kosovo looks more like a real state six months after independence with a constitution, anthem and passports, but its people are unimpressed with unfulfilled promises of a better life.

Kosovo’s ethnic Albanian-dominated parliament proclaimed independence from Serbia on February 17. It has been recognised by 45 countries led by the United States and most of the European Union.

The new constitution came into force on June 15, as well as a national anthem, while the first passports of the new republic were issued a month later and plans were made to open 10 embassies abroad.

That, however, is of little comfort to the people of Kosovo, one of the poorest parts of Europe with rampant poverty, unemployment and corruption.

For Selim Rexhepi, a 42-year-old Pristina taxi driver, the declaration of independence was one of the happiest moments in his life, but not the spur that his government promised would improve his living standards.

“Why do I need independence when most of the day I do not have electricity at home” and a lack of continuous water supply, complained Rexhepi.

The domination of the official political status of the breakaway Serbian province over its economy in recent years had “cost Kosovo dearly,” said local political analyst Safet Gerxhaliu.

“The status issue was used as a magic wand which would solve all problems,” said Gerxhaliu, who is also chairman of the Office for International Relations of the Kosovo Chamber of Commerce.

Gerxhaliu warned the government “must energetically face the main problems of society (or else face) social unrest by the same people who celebrated independence on February 17.”

But Kosovo Deputy Prime Minister Hajredin Kuci said despite being focused on “building a new state,” the leadership had also been insisting on a “good governance.”

“We have approved an economic programme which is meant to improve the situation,” Kuci said, adding its main pillars were development and lowering unemployment.

Almost half of Kosovo’s two million population – mostly ethnic Albanians – live in poverty. Joblessness stands at around 40 percent, and even higher for youths.

In July, international donors pledged 1.2bn euros ($1.78bn) to help build Kosovo’s battered economy, but insisted Pristina must root out graft at all levels.

Ahmeti said even though the declaration of independence from Serbia “removed one of the biggest obstacles for foreign investment,” the benefits “will not be seen for years to come.”

Many Kosovars wrongly expected independence to solve all their problems, including “electricity supply, poverty and unemployment,” said Shpend Ahmeti of a local think-tank, Institute for Advanced Studies GAP.

“Managing these expectations and pursuing reforms are now the biggest challenges (for the government) in the months to come,” said Ahmeti.

Another challenge for Pristina was the rejection of independence by Serbs who remained in Kosovo following its 1998-1999 conflict. The minority now accounts for little more than 100,000 of the population.

Kuci said the government expected Serbia’s new West-oriented government would stop supporting “extremists and attempts to undermine the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Kosovo.”

“We have the political will for them (the Serbs) to be integrated into Kosovo’s society,” Kuci vowed.

Serbs, who consider Kosovo the cradle of their history and culture and mainly live in the north, enjoy considerable political and economic support from Belgrade.

Ahmeti estimated that the “only way out of this situation is through economic integration where both parties will have an interest to cooperate ... so that trust can be created on both sides.”

“The political situation is so tense that the Serbian side sees no interest in taking part in Kosovo public life,” he said.

Kosovo’s constitution handed its government powers previously held by a United Nations mission which entered the territory in mid-1999, after NATO bombing ousted Serbian forces waging a crackdown on Albanian separatists.

Ethnic Albanians make up around 90 percent of Kosovo’s two million population. Only around a third of the Serbs who lived in Kosovo before the conflict remain, the rest having fled in fear of reprisal attacks.

Putin's Revenge for Kosovo and Iraq in Georgia

By wagering on NATO's lack of military options to confront Russia's actions in Georgia, and by controlling the bottleneck of energy flow to Europe through the Caucasus pipelines, Russia's new ruler Vladimir Putin has nearly put the finishing touches on America's downfall from its status as the world's only superpower, a process that began with its war in Iraq, or at least that is what he thought. Putin has wagered on Washington's military being tied up in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as on Europe's internal division regarding the results of the US's unilateral adventure in Iraq. He has estimated that the US would lack the political and diplomatic influence, and that it would lose its prestige upon abandoning, in practice, democracy's spoiled child in Georgia, President Mikheil Saakashavili.

The US's decision regarding Russia's confrontational strategy (instead of giving priority to partnership) has its perspectives and implications not only in the context of bilateral relations between the two countries, or on the relationship between NATO and Russia's neighbors in the Caucasus. It also affects the position and status of the US all over the world, including the Gulf region with its oil and gas, and the Middle East with its conflicts.

Astonishment and verbal protestation will not be sufficient for a man of steel such as Putin, with his Soviet background, Russian nationalism, vast oil resources, and strategic oil partnerships with the likes of China and Iran. Retreating to the front, or escaping to the back, is the impression accompanying American and European responses, deepening the impression that the US has become a paper tiger, and Europe a wildcat that toys with the tiger but fears the Russian bear in its own home, which is why it will not dare to be defiant.

Given such a situation, it seems to some that the unipolar era is over, that a new world order is taking shape under Russia's leadership and that the US has run out of options. Yet, what will happen if the US decides take the initiative to use Iraq, as it had envisioned, as an unparalleled military base, and to redeploy its forces by tactically withdrawing its troops to aircraft carriers, informing all those concerned that it has decided to exercise what military might it has and that its hands are not tied?

What will happen if the US informs its NATO allies that Afghanistan is their mission and their responsibility, to free US troops of the military burden and remove its reputation for having its hands tied? What if Washington decides that the partnership with Russia over resolving the nuclear crisis by offering incentives to Iran has become ineffective, as Moscow has taken itself out of the partnership and exhausted diplomacy to serve Tehran's interest in buying time and stalling while reinforcing its nuclear capabilities and expanding its influence in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, which the Islamic Republic of Iran has transformed into an Iranian base through Hezbollah?

The cost of these options should be considered on the basis of the cost of avoiding them. In other words, the US and Europe should carefully consider what to do with Putin's Russia, if they refuse to confront the fundamental message behind Russia's actions in Georgia, namely:

* Teaching every country in Russia's neighborhood the lesson that it must remain Moscow's friendly and obedient ally, and that it will not be allowed to become an ally of the US or a member of NATO.

* Informing Washington that it will not be forgiven for the mistake it made with Kosovo, and that revenge from Russia's perspective today is far more important than the partnership which was so important for Moscow under Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin. Things are different now, and the scope of such revenge will not be limited to the Caucasus but will reach the US wherever it finds the need to, in the Caucasus, Iran or elsewhere.

* Taking a qualitative step forward, in the framework of its oil and gas strategy, by securing Russia's control over the bottleneck of pipelines stretching across Georgia to Turkey which supplies Europe with its energy needs. Additionally, several major European countries, such as Germany, rely on Russia's gas for over 40% of their needs. Russia has laid an important foundation for its strategic decision to regain its former grandeur, namely that of oil alliances and gas balances.

The matter is not limited to Mikheil Saakashvili's excesses in South Ossetia or his miscalculations. It is rather about the meaning of submitting to Russia's response to what Moscow has described as adventures that must be stopped by any means necessary, including military incursion into Georgia's territories to teach it a lesson and to control the future of its pipelines. The leadership in Tbilisi, on the other hand, claims that Russia has set up a strategy of escalation and begun to provoke Georgia, and that Georgia had no choice but to defend itself.

Saakashvili has suffered great disappointment, as the US and Europe have, in practice, abandoned him. Perhaps he had believed that responding to Russia's show of power with a show of power of his own would automatically lead to partnership and accelerate Georgia's admission into NATO. So far, his wager seems to have failed on both counts.

What has taken place in Georgia constitutes a building-block in the grand Russian strategy set up by Putin in Russia's immediate neighborhood and on the international level. It would be wrong to believe that developments will be limited to the Caucasus or to Georgian territory, as Iran is the next stop in this strategy.

If Washington yields and behaves on the basis that its options are limited and costly and that it has no choice but to plead with Europe for salvation and bow down before Moscow, then the worst is yet to come. If those Americans who are angry at George Bush and his war in Iraq release their anger by rewarding Russia and Iran, and reinforcing their ability to expand, dominate, use threats and intimidation, revive the Soviet spirit, and mobilize allies on the basis of enmity to the US, it would be as if one were to chop off his nose to get back at his face.

There is now an urgent need for deepened strategic thinking regarding the American-European relationship, in the wake of the Iraq war in which the neoconservatives implicated the US. Such a war was a desperate decision which turned Iraq into a slippery step which may topple the US from its position of sole superpower. While the anger is well-founded, the challenges of the day demand far more than confining ourselves in blame and anger, and drawing lists of non-options. It is of the utmost necessity to formulate a comprehensive strategy towards Russia and Iran, at some point after the Iraq war, especially in the era of oil alliances and at a time when revenge is being employed as a fundamental political tool.

Moscow is not only taking revenge for Washington's mistake of supporting Kosovo's independence from Serbia, a measure which Moscow considered to be a direct insult, but also for the war in Iraq, of which excluding Russia from the country and its resources was a fundamental element. For two American errors, there were two Russian acts of revenge. And then there is Iran, where the matter is radically different, and where revenge takes a regional dimension, with a Russian-Iranian partnership directed against the US, based on exploiting American involvement in Iraq.

Vladimir Putin did not dwarf the US and turn it into a second-class country by his mere genius, but he intends to take advantage of the opportunity to abuse a dwarfed US to increase the possibilities of restoring Russia's grandeur. If he is met by apologies, he will move forward undeterred, supported by dangerous and violent nationalism. Only then will remorse catch up with those who focused the blame on Bush's adventures in Iraq and his mistakes in Kosovo, blame which he has certainly deserved, but without examining the designs of those benefiting from such errors and adventures, most particularly Russia and the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The Europeans in turn have the responsibility of careful examination, rather than simply following the trend of chewing hatred and blame for Bush and the US. They are on the verge of the worst economic recession in a Europe dependent on Russian gas. Today they have caught a glimpse and are now familiar with who Vladimir Putin is, how he thinks and how he acts.

When Putin resorted to military force against Chechnya, the world did not take notice of his military tendency to resolve problems by undermining diplomacy. Today, and merely to spite the US, many Muslims forget that Vladimir Putin has repeatedly taken violent military stances against Muslims in Chechnya and elsewhere, and celebrate his violence to compensate for their constant failure.

If the response is silence, fear, retreat and accepting that there is no other choice but submission, it will constitute a meaningful strategic message, not only to Russia but also to Iran, allowing them to further pursue their ambitions of regional hegemony. This is not an invitation to rush to military options against Iran or to a display of power directed at Moscow. However, both options are available, if the US wishes to resort to them, at a cost.

Perhaps the developments in Georgia will lead to seriously considering early withdrawal from Iraq to redeploy American troops on aircraft carriers where the US's naval military might is unparalleled. Such a measure would put an end to the impression that the US has no other choice but to submit. Tactical withdrawal from Iraq would free Washington's hands and enable the US to act confidently at sea.

The other option could be to stop saying and pretending that Iraq is not a military base for the US, and instead to behave in the opposite manner. In other words, it is perhaps time to cause a qualitative shift in the debate over US military capabilities inside Iraq, to turn them away from the dilemma of having their hands tied and to emphasize the importance and usefulness of Iraq being, in practice, an American military base that could be activated whenever the US's needs and higher strategic interests would demand it.

Canada to send five defence planners to help keep peace in Kosovo

Defence Minister Peter MacKay announced Friday that Canada will send five soldiers to Kosovo to help a NATO-led peacekeeping force.

They will be deployed for 12 months to NATO’s peacekeeping headquarters in Pristina, capital of the former Serbian province.

"Five Canadian Forces personnel can make a great difference," MacKay told a news conference. "Their know-how, their experience, their ability in co-ordinating in Kosovo I expect will make a real difference." The minister said the military members, described as defence planners, will be drawn from various bases across the country.

They’re main role will be co-ordinating funds and equipment sent from donor countries.

Discontinuity of Russia’s Policy: Kosovo and South Ossetia

Even if they do not have anything in common, Kosovo and South Ossetia became closer in last two weeks that they were ever before. Kosovo declared independence from Serbia in February 2008 that is recognized by about 45 world countries. Russia, backing Serbia in this issue, strongly opposes this independence arguing that such act creates precedence for every separatist region all around the world, especially mentioning those in Georgia; Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Almost half a year after the Kosovo’s declaration of independence, Georgia Army Forces suddenly attacked South Ossetia trying to reestablish control over the breaking province. South Ossetia declared independence from Georgia within collapse of Soviet Union, which was not recognized by any state, including Russia. From that time until present South Ossetia (together with Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh) represent a so-called “frozen conflict”.

What was the real reason of suddenly Georgian military operation and did Mikheil Saakashvili had Western (namely the US) support is not very important, since small countries were and will always be an element in the foreign policies of big ones. What is important is that Saakashvili made a terrible political and strategic mistake by using a military option for resolving a political problem.
Russian reaction against prospective NATO member presents her standpoint regarding NATO’s further enlargement toward Russia.

Russia’s respond against Georgian military operation was incredible fast and brutal. Bombing all Georgian military assets around whole country forced Georgian Army to withdraw. First military operation outside the Russian Federation completed with totally success. As every winner, Russia dictates peace criteria. The most interesting statement made by Russian officials was statement of Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, who said that Russia supports the position of Georgia's separatist South Ossetia (and Abkhazia) region in talks on their future status. Vladimir Lavrov, Russian Foreign Minister also argued that no document or agreement that includes words as “territorial integrity of Georgia” will be accepted by his country. All this means that Russia strongly supports secession of Georgia’s breakaway provinces which is in serious contradiction with Russian stand regarding Kosovo.

Such Russian standpoint puts Serbia in a difficult position, since Serbia still counts on Russian support in UN Security Council. So, if Russia raises her voice for South Ossetia’s independence from Georgia, Serbia will lose her most important ally and stay absolutely alone in her fight against Kosovo’s independence. On the other hand, Russian encouraging of the independence declaration of the Georgian provinces and their recognition will verify widely accepted opinion that Russian support to Serbia on Kosovo issue was just a continuation of Putin’s “confrontation policy”.

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Serbia wants international court opinion on Kosovo

Serbia said on Friday it would seek an opinion from the International Court of Justice on whether Kosovo's declaration of independence was legal and that Belgrade would abide by whatever the court said.

Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremic told a U.N. news conference he had asked for a motion to be put before the next annual session of the U.N. General Assembly, opening in mid-September, backing referral by Serbia of the thorny issue to the Hague-based ICJ.

Jeremic said he had put Serbia's request on Friday to U.N. Deputy Secretary-General Asha-Rose Migiro. A committee of the 192-member General Assembly will decide whether to include the item on the asseom the ICJ."

The Serbian minister portrayed the idea as the way out of the Kosovo impasse. "I think this is the way forward that has to be supported by opponents and supporters of Kosovo's independence alike," he added. "I think we should all come together in supporting international law."

Serbia, where a new, pro-Western government took office last month, is keen to join the European Union, which wants Belgrade to show flexibility on Kosovo and to hand over remaining war crimes suspects from the 1990s Balkan wars.

Jeremic sounded a hopeful note over controversial U.N. plans to hand over police authority in Kosovo to the European Union, which have been opposed by Serbia and Russia and have split the Security Council.

He said Serbia was discussing the matter with U.N. Kosovo envoy Lamberto Zannier and hoped the issue could be resolved in the autumn.

Turning to war crimes suspects, Jeremic said he was optimistic that "sooner rather than later" Belgrade would be able to announce that the two still at large - former Bosnian Serb commander Ratko Mladic and Croatian Serb leader Goran Hadzic - had been arrested. He gave no details.

Last month, Serbia arrested Bosnian Serb wartime leader Radovan Karadzic and sent him to the Hague war crimes court.